20 October 2015
...Geo-blocking and online platforms are the next dip in the roller-coaster that is the e-commerce sector enquiry - which is fast gathering pace.
On 24 September 2015 the European Commission announced that it is now launching two public consultations: one on geo-blocking and the other on online platforms.
The consultations’ aim is to identify and categorise potential antitrust problems and other practices which may create barriers to cross-border trade. Of note perhaps is the comment in Director General Laitenberger’s “retour aux sources” speech on 21 September that the competition authorities may use different tools to tackle the same behaviour. The suggestion is that where the behaviour is practised by a dominant undertaking, then competition law armoury may be used while behaviour by non-dominant undertakings may require other “legislative initiatives”. It is becoming clearer that there are certain topics that are very much in or out of the competition law remit of this particular enquiry...
The timeline for the next steps and beyond are summarised below.
UK parallel enquiry
In parallel to the above consultations, the UK House of Lords launched its own enquiry into online platforms. The deadline for responding to this enquiry is 16 October 2015.
The aim is to provide a “constructive contribution” to the EU debate. The aim is to identify the benefits that platforms can provide as well as collect data to inform any recommendations for regulatory change that the U.K. may propose.
More Questions than answers?
In short, for those involved in the sector, it can fairly be said that lots of people and institutions are currently asking lots of questions – some of which may be at cross purposes. What is less clear at the moment is who is responding and how the responses will in fact be used to inform policy.
15 October 2015
On 9 October 2015, the European Commission published its clearance decision in relation to the joint venture between three collecting societies (GEMA, STIM and PRSfM). This joint venture - and the European Commission’s (Commission) decision to clear it (following commitments offered by the parties) is of particular note, not only because it fits under the e-commerce umbrella (it is all about the licensing and administration of online rights in musical works), but also because it represents a further move towards breaking down the practice by collecting societies of dividing up the licensing and administration of copyright along national boundaries, long-criticised by the Commission. As highlighted by Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager in her recent speech in Florence:** barriers to cross-border trade can be created either by national copyright laws or by the use of contractual terms in copyright licences. This decision deals with the latter.
To be clear, up to now, reciprocal representation agreements between collecting societies have permitted each participating collecting society to license the repertoires of other collecting societies around the world to users but only for use in its own territory. Although collecting societies have started granting multi-territorial licences for their own repertoires, they have licensed the world repertoire of other collecting societies only on a mono-territorial basis for their home country.
The joint venture will provide new products on both sides of this two-sided market:
- The joint venture will provide multi-territorial licences to online platforms for all three collecting societies’ musical repertoires. Going forward, the likes of iTunes will need to negotiate only one single multi-territorial licence for all three repertoires instead of negotiating a licence for each country where the platforms operate. Small collecting societies who do not license their repertoire on a multi-territorial basis will also be able to request that their repertoire is included in any multi-territorial online licensing offer.
- Collecting societies and large music publishers will also have the opportunity to obtain copyright administration services on a multi-territorial basis for the first time. Until now such services have been offered for a single country, namely that of the collecting society providing the service.
What was the Commission concerned about?
The Commission’s concerns lay in the market for the provision of copyright administration services to collecting societies and particularly to large music publishers (so-called “Option 3 publishers”) in relation to transactional multi-territorial licences. These publishers tend to license the mechanical rights for their Anglo-American repertoires themselves but obtain a mandate from the PRSfM to license the performing rights. They still obtain administration services from collecting societies. One of the Commission’s concerns was that in return for granting a mandate to license the performing rights for the Option 3 publisher’s repertoire, the PRSfM would oblige Option 3 publishers to obtain all their administration services from the joint venture, thus excluding collecting societies who wished to compete in providing these services. In the eyes of the Commission, the joint venture might also impose exclusivity provisions or bundle such services in an attempt to foreclose competitors. Lastly, the Commission was concerned that the joint venture may make it difficult for users of its database to transfer their data to a competitor if they decided to switch to a different collecting society.
The commitments made by the parties
The PRSfM committed:
- not to use its position in relation to Option 3 publishers’ performing rights to require them to obtain their copyright administration services from the joint venture. Other collecting societies and Option 3 publishers will be able to pick and choose the services they require from the joint venture and such services will not be bundled together.
All three collecting societies committed that the joint venture would:
- not enter into exclusive contracts other than for database services;
- offer copyright administration services to competing copyright societies on fair reasonable and non-discriminatory terms when compared with the terms offered to its parent companies;
- facilitate switching; and
- allow termination of the contract at any time on the provision of reasonable notice.
Not only will the Collective Management Directive (“CMD”) be directly applicable to the joint venture, but the joint venture itself puts into practice the idea, made legally binding in the CMD, that musical repertoires should be able to be aggregated into multi-territorial online licences regardless of the location of the right-holder or the collecting society. In addition, the Commission’s decision may pave the way for easier switching by rights holders which will increase their choice of collecting society. Offline licensing and mono-territorial online licensing and administration are not the subject of the decision and will continue to function as before.
It will not be surprising if the impact of the CMD, the European Commission’s investigations in relation to the e-commerce sector enquiry as well as the review of copyright rules across the EU, lead to a change in the landscape relating to the licensing and administration of online musical rights, and pave the way for more exciting “tie-ups” in the future. Who knows if the offline world of music licensing will follow?
**Speech by Commissioner for Competition, Margrethe Vestager, at the 19th IBA Competition Conference, Florence 11 September 2015
12 October 2015
It seems that the CMA's opening of an investigation into Pfizer / Flynn (which we discussed here) may not be the only pending competition case on excessive pricing of pharmaceuticals. A possible investigation into Turing Pharmaceuticals is being mooted in the US, following the company's decision to increase the price of Daraprim (an anti-parasitic) from $13.50 to $750, according to reports.
Pricing, in particular excessive pricing, is a notoriously difficult area for competition authorities. The legal test does not lend itself well to markets where intellectual property rights may apply. There may also be many reasons why a company might seek to introduce above-inflation price increases: to reflect increased input / manufacturing costs, to improve the margin, to reflect changed competitive dynamics, to compensate for financial problems elsewhere in its business, and so on. None of these are in themselves contrary to competition law.
Nevertheless, price increases of the type introduced by Turing at least seem to indicate a lack of effective competition on the relevant market. The drug is long off patent, yet prices are evidently unconstrained by generic competition. This may be due to low sales of the drug, or manufacturing cost/complexity that third parties may find difficult to replicate without the originator's know-how. The regulatory framework almost certainly plays a role in raising barriers to entry and also – in countries where free pricing is an option – in failing to constrain the price at which such drugs are sold. The enormous differences in wealth and living standards across the globe also lead to difficult questions for pharmaceutical companies – high prices in one country may in fact facilitate lower prices being made available to health services in countries which are less able to afford such drugs.
These complex dynamics certainly contribute to the dearth of excessive pricing cases in this sector. Competition law seems an unlikely panacea. But pharmaceutical companies considering their pricing strategy should nevertheless be aware of the tools potentially available to competition authorities and private claimants.
The message to business seems to be:
- Don’t forget the possibility of competition law scrutiny when increasing prices;
- Document the objective basis for any price increases and be particularly cautious when increasing prices to captive parts of the market.
1 October 2015
Last night we had the pleasure of giving a seminar at our offices on competition law developments in the pharma sector. We looked at investigations into patent settlements, and in particular the ‘pay for delay’ cases. We also reflected at how the recently published Lundbeck and Servier decisions may impact upon other important areas for pharmaceutical companies, such as licensing transactions. We concluded by drawing some ‘bright lines’ to try to assist in navigating what can sometimes appear to be a very grey area, providing practical guidance where we could. After a thorough review of a complex, and sometimes daunting, area of competition law we enjoyed a well deserved drink with many familiar faces, and some new ones too...
For those of you who couldn’t make the seminar a webinar version is available here and the slides here.