E-Commerce Sector Inquiry: Digital Content

Last week, the European Commission published its Preliminary Report in the e-commerce sector inquiry. The Report focusses on two main areas: goods and digital content.  In each case, the Report surveys the responses received to the requests for information sent over 
the past 15 months and sets out the Commission’s preliminary findings.  We reported on those findings on goods here, and now examine the preliminary conclusions on digital content, which focus in particular on audio-visual and music products.

Contractual restrictions in licensing agreements

Based on the market data received, the Commission concludes that contractual restrictions, in terms of licensed transmission technologies, timing of releases and licensed territories, are the norm in digital content markets.  Exclusivity is also widespread and can be granted along one or more of a number of different dimensions. For example:

  • Technological restrictions: Rights may be split according to method of transmission (e.g. satellite, online, mobile), whether content was streamed, downloaded or watched on a standard TV set; licences may also cover ancillary/usage rights on features such as catch-up services or use of multiple screens.
  • Temporal restrictions: This includes the use of “release windows” which can be the subject of complex negotiations with significant price differences depending on the period secured.  
  • Territorial restrictions: Here the concerns in relation to digital content closely mirror those identified in relation to goods (as we have discussed here).  ‘Geo-blocking’ is common, but causes are multiple.  For example, the Report finds that the main reasons why digital content providers do not typically make their services available in more than one territory are: (a) the cost of purchasing content for new territories, and (b) that the rights for the content are not available for licensing in some territories. Even those digital content providers that do make their services available in more than one Member State often offer different catalogues in each Member State, normally because they are unable to obtain licences for all of the Member States in which they are active. 
Where geo-blocking was used, many of the agreements submitted to the Commission contained clauses enabling the right holder to monitor the implementation of geo-blocking measures and to suspend distribution or even terminate the agreement if the measures weren’t implemented to its satisfaction. Almost 60% of digital content provider respondents are contractually required by right holders to geo-block, although the percentage varies considerably between licensing business models and Member States. In Italy, for example, only a minority of respondents reported that geo-blocking occurred, whereas in the UK the majority did so.

Overall, contractual restrictions of these kinds are found to be prevalent in a number of sectors investigated, and are often included in contracts of long duration.  (An exception is noted in relation to music content, where less use is made of exclusive licensing.)  The Commission notes the difficulties to which this can give rise for new entrants and smaller players.  The same is true of certain prevalent payment structures, such as requirement for advance payment, minimum guarantees and fixed/flat fees.  All of these are said to make it difficult to compete with large established providers.  (The results do also indicate that certain flexible payment arrangements have been used for certain types of digital products, which allow for payments proportionate to the number of users and facilitate competition. The Commission indicates that it is likely to encourage the wider use of such payment mechanisms, as they might promote risk sharing and streamlining of incentives along the supply chain.)

Lost in translation? 

As every good competition lawyer knows, contractual restrictions do not always translate into restrictions on competition.  The conclusion announced by the Commission, that it “will assess on a case-by-case basis whether enforcement action is necessary to ensure effective competition” is thus hardly surprising.  The question for companies active in the licensing or distribution of digital content will be to translate the Commission’s preliminary conclusions into a concrete risk assessment as to the status of existing licensing agreements and practices.

This is of course only a preliminary report, on which comments are requested.  Past sector inquiries (such as that in the pharmaceutical sector) suggest, however, that amendments after the first report are likely to be around tone and details rather than on the substance.  The data gathered by the Commission will already be under intensive analysis and case teams may already have been put together to start to pursue individual cases.  

It appears likely that such cases will be one of two main types:

  • Geo-blocking cases in which a breach of Article 101 is identified, akin to the ongoing Hollywood Studios investigation (as to which, see here), the outcome of which is likely to turn on eventual review by the EU courts (or potential further commitment decisions of the type entered into by Paramount).  
  • Abuse of dominance cases based around foreclosure of new entrants.  In principle, such cases could be brought against either content providers or rights holders, depending on the source of market power.  The Commission will want to try to focus such cases around the use of contractual provisions (e.g. the use of long-term exclusivity) rather than on refusal to license per se, where the existing law is likely to make new cases in this complex field very difficult.
It is early days, but we question how many abuse of dominance cases of this kind are likely. The Report suggests that many of the perceived market access problems arise from widespread structural issues, rather than the conduct of individual undertakings.  As content markets are currently likely to be national in scope (due to language requirements, if nothing else), it may be for national competition authorities to take the lead in this.  The Commission can of course also sponsor new legislation, as it has already done in relation to geo-blocking as it relates to goods (see here).  If that is on the agenda, a number of rounds of further consultation can be expected.  Stakeholders are invited to submit responses to this particular Report by 18 November 2016. 

That’s a wrap! The European Commission accepts Paramount’s pay-TV commitments

We hope you've got your popcorn ready because yesterday, there was a new development in the ongoing Sky UK / Hollywood Studios pay-TV investigation: the European Commission announced that it has accepted the commitments offered by Paramount Pictures, which are now legally binding.
 
We've blogged extensively on this investigation here and here, but as a quick recap:
July 2015: Statement of Objections

The Commission sent a Statement of Objections to Sky UK and six US film studios (including Paramount) in July 2015.  The Statement addressed certain clauses in the licensing contracts between Paramount and Sky UK which:

  1. prevented Sky UK from allowing EU customers outside the UK and Ireland to access Paramount films via satellite and online; and  
  2. required Paramount to ensure that broadcasters other than Sky UK were prevented from making their pay-TV services available in the UK and Ireland.

The Commission was mainly concerned that these clauses raised competition issues for pay-TV broadcasters which were operating on a cross-border basis, and consequently might restrict the EU's Single Market.  
 
April 2016: Paramount's Commitments

In response, Paramount offered four proposed commitments to the Commission in April 2016.  These were:
 
  1. when licensing its film output for pay-TV to a broadcaster in the EEA, Paramount would not (re)introduce contractual obligations, which prevent or limit a pay-TV broadcaster from responding to unsolicited requests from consumers within the EEA but outside of the pay-TV broadcaster’s licensed territory (No “Broadcaster Obligation”);
  2. when licensing its film output for pay-TV to a broadcaster in the EEA, Paramount Pictures would not (re)introduce contractual obligations, which require Paramount to prohibit or limit pay-TV broadcasters located outside the licensed territory from responding to unsolicited requests from consumers within the licensed territory (No “Paramount Obligation”);
  3. Paramount Pictures would not seek to bring an action before a court or tribunal for the violation of a Broadcaster Obligation in an existing agreement licensing its film output for pay-TV; and
  4. Paramount Pictures would not act upon or enforce a Paramount Obligation in an existing agreement licensing its film output for pay-TV.

The latest development

Following the usual market testing of the commitments, the European Commission yesterday announced that it has accepted them.  Paramount's commitments look wide-reaching: they apply to online and satellite broadcast services, and cover the standard pay-TV services as well as relevant subscription video-on-demand services.  The Commission also stated that the commitments will last for five years and apply throughout the European Economic Area.

The investigation into the other five studios continues, with the other companies still disputing the Commission's allegations.  But this latest announcement could well act as a trigger for further developments (and potentially even proposals of commitments), so stay tuned for a sequel coming to a screen near you soon.

Competition law no bar to patent licence royalties

Advocate General Wathelet has delivered a significant Opinion on the relationship between Article 101(1) and patent licences. This arose from a disputed arbitration award between Genentech and Sanofi-Aventis, and followed a reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), from the Paris Court of Appeal. 

The AG noted that Article 101(1) is not there to protect the efficacy of commercial arrangements, and will be engaged only where an agreement between undertakings has the object or effect of restricting or preventing competition and affects trade between member states. 

What was the case about? 

The original arbitration concerned a dispute over unpaid royalty payments under a patent licence where one of the underlying patents had been revoked. The arbitrator found that the licensee should continue to pay royalties, notwithstanding the revocation of the patent. This was on basis that the licensee had entered into the licence to enable it to use the relevant technology without the risk of litigation. The licensee contested the award. The French Court of Appeal referred various questions to the CJEU including whether paying royalties for a revoked patent had put the company at a competitive disadvantage to competitors who had not been required to pay for the technology and therefore infringed Article 101(1).

What about Article 101 and Patent royalties?

Wathelet commended the reasoning in Ottung (1989 CJEU) that an obligation to pay royalties in a licensing agreement after patent expiry “may infringe Article 101(1) TFEU where the licence agreement either does not grant the licensee the right to terminate the agreement by giving reasonable notice, or seeks to restrict the licensee’s freedom of action after termination.” 

Applying that approach, Wathelet considered that there was no infringement of Article 101(1) here, as Genentech was freely able to terminate the agreement with a “very short” notice period of two months, and its “freedom of action was not restricted in any way during the period after termination, and it was not subject to any clause preventing it from challenging the validity or infringement of the patents at issue”. He also observed that the licence contained no restrictions on the licensee’s ability to set prices or conduct research.

The AG therefore held that Article 101(1) was not engaged and that Genentech should pay Hoechst EUR 110 million in back royalties even though a licensed patent had been revoked. In the circumstances:  “the mere use of the technology at issue during the term of the licence agreement was sufficient to trigger the obligation to pay”. 

The position taken by the Advocate-General reflects the views set out in the Technology Transfer Guidelines (paragraph 184) which regards royalty arrangements in technology licences as generally outside the scope of Article 101 and falling into the realm of commercial negotiation.
 
Arbitration disputes and Article 101? 

The AG also confirmed that competition issues arising in the context of arbitrations can always be referred by national courts to the CJEU. 

He gave short shrift to arguments that dealing with Article 101(1) issues through the  preliminary ruling process would infringe French law. It had been argued that French law prevented international arbitration awards being subject to judicial review, save in circumstances where there has been a flagrant infringement of international public policy. 

The AG considered that the CJEU was bound to give a preliminary ruling upon request by a national court, unless the request related to a fictitious dispute, or was on general or hypothetical questions, where the questions to the CJEU bore no relation to the facts.

So where does the case leave patentees?

This case is important for many patent owners and licensees, as it clarifies that Article 101(1) is not a bar to enforcing a licensing agreement and receiving royalties even when a licensed patent has been declared invalid (or, by implication, expired). 

This is in direct contrast to the US Supreme Court’s decision in Kimble v Marvel of June 2015, which confirmed that a patent holder cannot charge royalties for the use of his invention in the US after its patent term has expired. 

It will be interesting to see the CJEU’s final decision, as AG opinions are only persuasive (but in practice usually followed).

Genentech Inc. v Hoechst GmbH, formerly Hoechst AG, Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH (Case C-567/14).

Digital Single Market – geo-blocking of digital content

The Competition Commissioner, Margrethe Vestager, has today published her initial findings on geo-blocking, as part of the ongoing e-commerce sector inquiry. The inquiry, which was launched in May 2015, forms part of the Commission-wide digital single market initiative (see our previous posts here, here and here).
The Commission has found that geo-blocking is widespread in the EU, particularly for digital content. Geo-blocking is a technical practice which prevents consumers from accessing online content based upon residence.  Technical restrictions which prevent consumers from purchasing goods from other countries are considered alongside content restrictions in this report.  The fact sheet, and accompanying press release, provide significant insight as to how EU competition law may apply to such practices.

First, the Commission recognises that unilateral business decisions not to sell into different territories, when made by a non-dominant company, do not raise competition law issues. However, the Commission fails to comment on whether unilateral geo-blocking by dominant companies could be anticompetitive, leaving the door open for future enforcement… 

Second, the Commission reiterates its concern that geo-blocking linked to agreements between suppliers and distributors may be anticompetitive. The Commission found that 12% of retailers and 59% of digital content providers face contractual restrictions to geo-block.  Vestager indicates that DG Competition will be taking a closer look at these arrangements.  She accepts that there may be legitimate reasons to geo-block but plans to address ‘unjustified barriers’ (without indicating what they might be).  

Looking ahead, it will be interesting to see how Vestager’s findings fit in with the broader digital single market initiative. Particularly in relation to digital content, and in the context of the Commission’s ongoing Hollywood Studios Investigation, little headway can be made without reform of copyright law – there have already been a number of legislative proposals in that area, with further proposals due in May. 

Vestager today promised that the Preliminary Report in the e-commerce sector inquiry is on the horizon, due to be published in mid-2016. In the meantime, we will be assimilating the full report, and picking up on points of interest.  So watch this space…

Francion Brooks

Why a Spanish state aid decision is making EU governments nervous


In an expansion of our usual repertoire, this post is taking a quick look at the relationship between EU state aid rules and national support for national television platforms. 

The long running Spanish state aid saga, concerning the conversion of analogue television transmission to digital transmission, has reached a decisive stage with a decision by the lower European court, the General Court of the European Union (“the Court”), in 6 joined and similar cases on 26 November 2015.  Although an appeal to the European Court of Justice is technically possible, it seems unlikely.
 
What is the EU state aid regime?

For those of you unfamiliar with the state aid regime, the rules are set out in the EU Treaties (Article 107 TFEU) and govern (and attempt to limit) when EU member states can use public funds to support domestic industry.  The purpose of these rules, in common with the competition rules, is to level the playing field across the EU for industry.  Consequently, the application and interpretation of the rules are intensely political. 

What was the case about? 
 
The Court rejected appeals by a number of Spanish regional authorities against an infringement decision of the European Commission and in the process confirmed a number of important state aid principles.  

Principally, the Court upheld the Commission’s decision that the fact that the Spanish government had failed to respect the principle of ‘platform neutrality’, as its digital switchover funding was only available to Digital Terrestrial Television (“DTT”), as opposed to holding a procurement competition in which satellite, cable and internet protocol TV could also bid.  This conferred a ‘selective advantage’ on DTT in relation to its competitors and was therefore state aid. 

What makes this case interesting? 


The case raises questions about the ‘platform neutrality’ of other compensation schemes for DTT.  In particular, it highlighted the issue of whether DTT platform operators should receive compensation for regulatory changes, in this case changes to spectrum position; when this is not available to other (pay) digital television platforms. 

In the UK, the operators of the DTT platform have received public funds to compensate them for moving their channels to other spectrum frequencies.  However, the DTT platform was not selected through a competitive procurement process.  Therefore, this compensation may raise some state aid questions. 

For example, in 2014 OFCOM decided to move the DTT platform from the 700 MHz band to a lower frequency, in order to use the 700 MHz band for mobile data.  The change is estimated to have cost the UK Treasury between £550–660 million.

Equally, other (pay) television platforms do not receive similar compensation for regulatory changes, which could result in extra costs or a loss of income.  For example, the Department of Culture Media and Sport’s (“DCMS”) 2015 proposal to deregulate the Communications Act 2003 (“the Act”) may make it harder for Sky to charge public service broadcasters for ‘technical platform services’. 

How about future implications? 

The Spanish DTT case also suggests that similar compensation schemes for converting analogue to digital radio, using the Digital Audio Broadcasting (“DAB”) system, may be challenged by the Commission, again on the basis of ‘platform neutrality’. 

Unless EU member states hold public procurement competitions to select the technical solution for the provision of digital radio, they could therefore be open to allegations of state aid, as there are a number of competing technical systems to DAB; such as DRM+, HD Radio and DVB-T.

“Everything online” including “everything copyright”

On 9 October 2015, the European Commission published its clearance decision in relation to the joint venture between three collecting societies (GEMA, STIM and PRSfM). This joint venture - and the European Commission’s (Commission) decision to clear it (following commitments offered by the parties) is of particular note, not only because it fits under the e-commerce umbrella (it is all about the licensing and administration of online rights in musical works), but also because it represents a further move towards breaking down the practice by collecting societies of dividing up the licensing and administration of copyright along national boundaries, long-criticised by the Commission. As highlighted by Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager in her recent speech in Florence:**   barriers to cross-border trade can be created either by national copyright laws or by the use of contractual terms in copyright licences. This decision deals with the latter.

To be clear, up to now, reciprocal representation agreements between collecting societies have permitted each participating collecting society to license the repertoires of other collecting societies around the world to users but only for use in its own territory. Although collecting societies have started granting multi-territorial licences for their own repertoires, they have licensed the world repertoire of other collecting societies only on a mono-territorial basis for their home country. 

Several “firsts”

The joint venture will provide new products on both sides of this two-sided market:

  • The joint venture will provide multi-territorial licences to online platforms for all three collecting societies’ musical repertoires. Going forward, the likes of iTunes will need to negotiate only one single multi-territorial licence for all three repertoires instead of negotiating a licence for each country where the platforms operate. Small collecting societies who do not license their repertoire on a multi-territorial basis will also be able to request that their repertoire is included in any multi-territorial online licensing offer. 
  • Collecting societies and large music publishers will also have the opportunity to obtain copyright administration services on a multi-territorial basis for the first time. Until now such services have been offered for a single country, namely that of the collecting society providing the service. 
What was the Commission concerned about?

The Commission’s concerns lay in the market for the provision of copyright administration services to collecting societies and particularly to large music publishers (so-called “Option 3 publishers”) in relation to transactional multi-territorial licences. These publishers tend to license the mechanical rights for their Anglo-American repertoires themselves but obtain a mandate from the PRSfM to license the performing rights. They still obtain administration services from collecting societies. One of the Commission’s concerns was that in return for granting a mandate to license the performing rights for the Option 3 publisher’s repertoire, the PRSfM would oblige Option 3 publishers to obtain all their administration services from the joint venture, thus excluding collecting societies who wished to compete in providing these services.  In the eyes of the Commission, the joint venture might also impose exclusivity provisions or bundle such services in an attempt to foreclose competitors. Lastly, the Commission was concerned that the joint venture may make it difficult for users of its database to transfer their data to a competitor if they decided to switch to a different collecting society.

The commitments made by the parties

The PRSfM committed: 

  • not to use its position in relation to Option 3 publishers’ performing  rights to require them to obtain their copyright administration services from the joint venture. Other collecting societies and Option 3 publishers will be able to pick and choose the services they require from the joint venture and such services will not be bundled together.
All three collecting societies committed that the joint venture would:

  • not enter into exclusive contracts other than for database services; 
  • offer copyright administration services to competing copyright societies on fair reasonable and non-discriminatory terms when compared with the terms offered to its parent companies; 
  • facilitate switching; and 
  • allow termination of the contract at any time on the provision of reasonable notice.
Not only will the Collective Management Directive (“CMD”) be directly applicable to the joint venture, but the joint venture itself puts into practice the idea, made legally binding in the CMD, that musical repertoires should be able to be aggregated into multi-territorial online licences regardless of the location of the right-holder or the collecting society. In addition, the Commission’s decision may pave the way for easier switching by rights holders which will increase their choice of collecting society.  Offline licensing and mono-territorial online licensing and administration are not the subject of the decision and will continue to function as before.

It will not be surprising if the impact of the CMD, the European Commission’s investigations in relation to the e-commerce sector enquiry as well as the review of copyright rules across the EU, lead to a change in the landscape relating to the licensing and administration of online musical rights, and pave the way for more exciting “tie-ups” in the future. Who knows if the offline world of music licensing will follow?

**Speech by Commissioner for Competition, Margrethe Vestager,  at the 19th IBA Competition Conference, Florence 11 September 2015 

Geo-blocking and the Single Digital Market: a new statement of objections

Last week, the European Commission made concrete moves which it thinks will help it to deliver on its promise to create a Single Digital Market.  On Thursday (23 July) DG Competition sent a statement of objections to six major Hollywood studios and Sky UK claiming that their contracts involve anti-competitive clauses.  What is at issue?  Nothing other than the “geo-blocking” clauses that have already been the subject of sceptical comment in the context of the European Commission’s e-commerce sector inquiry (for more on this see here and here and here and here). 
Geo-blocking, in the words of the European Parliament in its recent study (studies on challenges for competition policy in a digitalised economy), is the practice of “preventing users from accessing content based on location”.  DG Competition alleges that Sky UK and each of six major Hollywood studios (NBC Universal, Paramount Pictures, Sony, 20th Century Fox, Warner Brothers and Disney) bilaterally entered into licensing agreements which obliged Sky UK to restrict consumers from other EU Member States from accessing UK pay TV services either online or via satellite when in other EU Member States.  Film rights (and indeed other rights) are often licensed on an exclusive basis to a single broadcaster in each Member State. The Commission suggests that where licensing terms prevent the exclusive broadcaster being able to respond to unsolicited requests to transmit content to other countries, then this may partition the single market and infringe Article 101(1) – a transfer of the active/passive selling distinction from the realm of goods and services to the world of digital content and national copyright. 
 
The investigation began in 2014 and similar investigations are under way in other EU Member States. They follow the FAPL decision of October 2011 (here). Those familiar with this area will recall that the Murphy case did not hold that it was anti-competitive for the FA Premier League to enter into exclusive licensing arrangements with a broadcaster in each country but it did hold that it was contrary to the competition rules to require a broadcaster to prevent its satellite decoder cards (which enable reception of the licensed program content) from being used outside the licensed territory see here for a discussion on the Advocate General’s opinion in FAPL.
 
However, dealing with this issue does not merely involve contractual arrangements that impose absolute territorial protection - complicating the matters under investigation are national cultural concerns and national copyright rules. The European Parliament recently noted in its studies on challenges for competition policy in a digitalised economy that the ability to access content from anywhere in the EU may also be as a result of geographical restrictions imposed by owners of intellectual property rights. This is why geo-blocking will be assessed not only under the antitrust rules but also by reviewing copyright law across Europe.  The Commission is also keen to ensure wider access to online content within the internal market which will involve a review of the Cable and Satellite Directive. The allegations raised by the Commission against Sky UK and the Hollywood Majors may have a profound impact on the scope of copyright protection (particularly in relation to the doctrine of exhaustion) and may foreshadow significant changes to the copyright landscape once the modernisation of EU copyright law gets underway. 
  
Geo blocking is a major focus of the e-commerce sector inquiry and we will undoubtedly be seeing more investigations on this topic.  As companies start to respond to the chunky Commission information requests now being sent out by the sector enquiry case team, they need to have an eye on key Commission’s concerns on this subject, which may ultimately result in some significant pressure on existing business practices.


'Care'-ful with know-how and trade marks

Recent developments (in particular the Motorola / Samsung decisions relating to the use of standard essential patents, alluded to on this blog here) may suggest that competition law and IP are unhappy bedfellows, with the former hampering IP right holders' ability to obtain injunctive relief in respect of their patent rights.  

Last week's judgment by Mr Justice Henderson in the High Court provides something of a corrective. In Carewatch Care Services v. Focus Caring Services et al, a competition law defence was raised in respect of a claim that the defendants had breached post-termination restrictions in a care home franchise agreement.  

The raising of 'euro-defences' in general commercial litigation is sometimes viewed as something of a try-on. Generally, it is all too rare to see the limits to the competition rules, with competition authorities all too rarely giving reasoned analysis as to why certain agreements or practices do not infringe.

Here, there was no criticism of Focus for having raised the competition law defences, but those defences did not hinder the claimant’s enforcement of the contractual restrictions.  Applying Pronuptia de Paris, as suitably adjusted for a services, rather than a distribution, franchise, Henderson J robustly dismissed those defences. He particularly emphasised the need for the franchisor to have the ability to protect its know-how and reputation in a setting characterised by the intensely personal relationships between carer and care-home resident - to do otherwise would be to allow the former franchisee to benefit from the knowledge imparted to it by the franchisor to set up in competition with it.  An injunction restraining breach of the post-termination restrictions was therefore allowed.

Sophie Lawrance

Another collecting society has competition law concerns…

Further to recent ramblings on the ‘Czech Spa’ case, I thought I’d quickly mention another collecting society case.  As you’ll remember, collecting societies operate in two-sided markets, providing services to both: (i) the copyright holder or author (i.e. upstream); and (ii) the end user of the repertoire (i.e. downstream).  Whereas the Czech spa case concerned services to the latter, the recent Buma/Stemra case in the Netherlands concerned services to the former.

The Dutch authority had investigated the possible abuse by the national collecting society, Buma/Stemra.  Dutch authors rely on Buma/Stemra for the collection of royalties from the exploitation of their work on TV and radio.  However, authors don’t always necessarily need the collecting society’s other services, for example for services for music played over the internet where online exploitation is easier for rights holders to process themselves.  Buma/Stemra had only offered an all-in-one package covering all formats – this gave rights holders little choice when deciding which rights to transfer across to the collecting society and how they sought remuneration for their songs or lyrics online.

To conclude the investigation, Buma/Stemra offered commitments promising to give rights holders more choice about which rights they transfer to it.  An ‘opt-out’ system will be created, introducing greater flexibility for authors to retain their rights in different categories.  The Dutch authority has welcomed the commitments (see here) and expects them to result in further online innovation, to the benefit of both rights holders and music fans.

It is fascinating to see competition law used as a tool to encourage innovation in the traditional collecting society business model.  With a lot of the recent focus being on collecting societies’ services to rights users, it’s interesting to see that rights holders are also keen to wield the competition law sword.  I suspect that this isn’t the end of the story across the EU...

Osman Zafar