15 March 2018
On 8 March 2018, the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) gave an initial judgment (see here) in the appeals brought by GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and a number of generic manufacturers against the Competition and Markets Authority’s (CMA) 2016 Paroxetine decision (see here and here). As explained further below, the CAT has (in a move which perhaps goes against the prevailing zeitgeist) not reached final conclusions on the appeals, but has rather referred a number of questions to the Court of Justice in Luxembourg.
The infringements identified by the CMA in its Paroxetine decision arose out of three patent settlement agreements made in 2001 and 2002 between GSK and various generic manufacturers of paroxetine.
Paroxetine is an anti-depressant (selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor “SSRI”), marketed by GSK under the brand name “Seroxat”, which during the infringement period was one of its highest selling products, accounting for £71.6 million (10% of revenue) in 2001.
The CMA’s investigation into paroxetine was the first UK case to grapple with the contentious area of patent settlement agreements which limit generic companies’ ability to bring their own product to market. The investigation was formally launched by the OFT in 2011 on the basis of information obtained by the European Commission through its pharmaceutical sector inquiry (2009).
Following a significant further period of investigation, the CMA in 2016 issued a decision fining GSK, Alpharma and Generics (UK) a total of £44.99 million for agreeing to delay the entry of generic paroxetine in breach of Chapter I and/or Article 101 TFEU. GSK received the largest penalty, being fined £37,606,275 for its parallel infringement of the Chapter II prohibition:
- The CMA found that between 2001 and 2004 GSK agreed to make payments and other value transfers of over £50 million to generic suppliers of paroxetine; this amounted to a restriction of competition by object and/or effect.
- The CMA also found that GSK’s conduct induced generic providers to delay their efforts to independently enter the UK paroxetine market, abusing its dominant position in breach of Chapter II of the Competition Act.
The CAT Judgment
The essential element of the CAT’s March 2018 judgment is the reference of five issues to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. As things stand, the exact text of the questions has not been formulated (and will no doubt be the subject of fierce debate among the parties). However, the issues referred will relate to the following areas:
- Potential competition: whether the existence of an interim injunction against generic manufacturers was an insurmountable barrier for entering the market.
The provisional view of the Tribunal was to find that it was not (since, for example, it could have been discharged). However, it decided to refer a question to the CJEU as the question was similar to one raised in Lundbeck’s appeal (see here). This reference raises issues not dissimilar to those at play in the recent Roche judgment of the CJEU, which considered whether potentially unlawful products could be viewed as potential competitors (see here).
- Restriction of competition by object: when the strength of a patent is uncertain, does a transfer of value from the originator to a generic of an amount substantially greater than avoided litigation costs, under a settlement agreement in which the generic company agrees not to enter the market with its generic product and not to challenge the originator’s patent, constitute a restriction by object?
The CAT emphasised a number of points in connection with this question, including a notable recognition that (a) the uncertainty over patent strength means that a possible outcome of the litigation was that the generic challengers would be held to infringe a valid patent; and (b) an outcome of litigation which upheld the patent should not be viewed as a less competitive outcome than the situation where the patent was overturned.
A second related question was also identified, which seeks to establish whether a settlement comprising a value transfer which also provides some benefits to consumers (in the form of limited supplies of authorised generic products) should also be viewed as restrictive by object. Again, the preliminary view of the Tribunal was that such limited competitive benefits are not sufficient to draw into question the overall categorisation of the agreement as a by object infringement. If that is correct, it is necessarily a conclusion which will have to be considered in detail for any specific patent settlement agreement, and suggests that a blanket ‘by object’ approach will not be warranted.
- Restrictions by effect: in order to show a restriction by effect is it necessary to establish that the counterfactual would have been more competitive? The Appellants argued that the CMA’s Decision did not sufficiently consider the potentially pro-competitive effects of GSK’s agreements with generic manufacturers, for example the savings to the NHS compared to the situation where no authorised generics were on the market.
The CAT also started to grapple with an issue which has been underplayed in the European decisions to date, namely the relevance of the outcome of the underlying patent litigation. If one realistic outcome of that litigation was success for GSK, the approach proposed by the CMA would be to reduce the test for identifying effects to “the probability of a possibility”. On the other hand, the CAT did not seem to acknowledge the risk of creating a situation where an agreement is considered restrictive of competition by object yet does not possess the requisite degree of probability for an effects finding that is not made out. This is surely an issue that will have to be fully played out before this, and similar cases, are finally resolved. (Damages litigation in relation to patent settlement agreements is likely to bring this issue to the fore, even if the CJEU elects to side-step the question.)
- The correct approach to defining the relevant product market: is the relevant product market paroxetine or all SSRIs? While the Tribunal supported the CMA’s finding of dominance on the basis of a market limited to paroxetine, it criticised its reasoning. It considered the CMA to have taken an overly narrow approach to market definition, based on the impact of generic entry on the price of paroxetine - following the Commission’s ‘natural events’ approach used in its AstraZeneca Decision (2005) (see here). However, the CAT supported the view that from the time when there were potential generic entrants, the market was limited to paroxetine and its generics. It recognised that this preliminary view, which suggests a significant change in the relevant market over time (despite no suggestion that the view of prescribing professionals was subject to a similar change) was a departure from existing case law. In the authors’ view, this approach will lead to legal uncertainty and, more importantly, inappropriately substitutes an analysis based on perceived competitive constraints for an assessment based principally on objective demand factors. As the CAT itself notes, this approach would suggest successful drugs will almost always be found to constitute a distinct market at least from the time when generic entry becomes likely. As the Tribunal notes, this approach would amount to a material change to the “IP bargain” which “might adversely affect the economic purpose of patent legislation”.
Nevertheless, in making the reference on this point, the CAT has flagged some significant issues which should weigh in the CJEU’s eventual analysis.
- Abuse: are potential benefits to the NHS relevant to the assessment of whether GSK had abused a dominant position by entering into the agreements?
The final question on abuse is limited to an allusion back to the questions referred in relation to the object and effect of anti-competitive agreements. The central issue is again the question of whether the limited pro-competitive benefits derived from the presence of the generic companies as distributors of an authorised generic product are sufficient to undermine the main finding as anti-competitive effects.
Although the judgment is provisional in nature, there is much to absorb. We will report further when the agreed text of the questions to be referred has been published.
23 January 2017
On 18 January, the FTC announced that Mallinckrodt ARD Inc. (formerly Questcor Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) and its parent company have agreed to pay $100 million to settle FTC charges that they violated antitrust laws when Questcor acquired the rights to a drug that threatened its monopoly in the U.S. market for adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH) drugs. The announcement was made concurrently with the release of the FTC's complaint. Antitrust (as opposed to merger) cases about acquisitions of competing technology are not an everyday occurrence. However, this complaint has something of the flavour of the EU Commission’s Tetra Pak 1 decision. In that case, the EU Commission objected to Tetra Pak’s acquisition (through a merger) of exclusive rights to what was at the time the only viable competing technology to Tetra Pak’s dominant aseptic packaging system. The Commission (and subsequently the EU courts) held that this would prevent competitors from entering the market and therefore amounted to an abuse of a dominant position.
The FTC’s Mallinckrodt complaint alleges that while benefitting from an existing monopoly over the only U.S. ACTH drug, Acthar, Questcor illegally acquired the U.S. rights to develop a competing drug, Synacthen (a synthetic ACTH drug which is pharmacologically very similar to Acthar). This acquisition stifled competition by preventing any other company from using the Synacthen assets to develop a synthetic ACTH drug, preserving Questcor’s monopoly and allowing it to maintain extremely high prices for Acthar.
To judge by the FTC’s complaint, the case appears to contain some pretty stark facts which may have contributed to the immediate settlement of the proceedings by Mallinckrodt. Those facts also bring the case squarely into line with the US and EU competition regulators’ current concern over excessive pricing in pharma.
First up is the finding that Questcor had a 100% share of the U.S. ACTH market and that it took advantage of that monopoly to repeatedly raise the prices of Acthar from $40 a vial in 2001 to more than $34,000 per vial today – an 85,000% increase. The complaint details that in August 2007 Questcor increased the price of Acthar more than 1,300% overnight from $1,650 to $23,269 per vial and that it has taken significant and profitable increases on eight occasions since 2011 pushing the price up another 46% to its current $34,034 per vial. Acthar is a speciality drug used to treat infantile spasms, a rare seizure disorder affecting infants, as well as being a drug of last resort (owing to its cost) for a variety of other serious medical conditions. According to the FTC, Acthar treatment for an infant with infantile spasms can cost more than $100,000. In Europe, Canada and other parts of the world doctors treat these conditions with Synacthen which is available at a fraction of the price of Acthar in the U.S. (Synacthen is not available in the U.S. as it does not have FDA approval.) The FTC relies on the supra-competitive prices charged in the U.S. for Acthar as evidence of Questcor’s monopoly power as well as its 100% market share and the existence of substantial barriers to entry.
It is also part of the FTC’s case that Questcor disrupted the bidding process for Synacthen when the rights came up for acquisition. According to the complaint, Questcor first sought to acquire Synacthen in 2009, and continued to monitor the competitive threat posed by Synacthen thereafter. When the U.S. rights to Synacthen were eventually marketed in 2011, dozens of companies expressed an interest in acquiring them with three firms proceeding through several rounds of detailed negotiations. All three firms planned to commercialise Synacthen and to use it to compete directly with Acthar including by pricing Synacthen well below Acthar. In October 2012, Questcor submitted an offer for Synacthen and subsequently acquired the rights to Synacthen for the U.S. and thirty-five other countries and did not subsequently bring the product to market in the US.
In addition to the $100 million payout, the proposed court order requires that Questcor grant a licence to develop Synacthen to treat infantile spasms and nephrotic syndrome to a licensee approved by the FTC, a pretty far-reaching remedy.
This case is the latest in a string of cases on both sides of the Atlantic relating to escalating pharma prices (as discussed in our previous blog posts here and here). While companies retain significant scope to price products as they see fit, it reaffirms that pharma companies should be wary of implementing very significant price increases in the absence of good objective reasons for doing so. This is particularly so where the increase is facilitated by commercial strategies such as acquiring IP rights to existing/potentially competitive products. In the EU, it is also worth remembering that – as established by Tetra Pak I (on appeal to the General Court) – an agreement which falls within a block exemption can at the same time constitute an infringement of Article 102. So companies and their advisors should remember to wear Article 101 and 102 hats when reviewing agreements.
22 December 2016
In the latest instalment of the pay-TV saga, the French pay-TV operator Canal Plus has asked EU judges to overturn a commitments decision agreed earlier this year between Paramount and the European Commission. Those commitments (on which we reported here) ended Paramount’s involvement in the Commission’s antitrust investigation into the distribution arrangements between Sky UK and the six Hollywood film Studios, with no infringement finding or fine.
The Commission’s investigation into Disney, NBCUniversal, Twentieth Century Fox and Warner Bros remains ongoing. In the background is the Commission’s Digital Single Market Strategy which aims to break down barriers preventing cross-border E-commerce.
What has been agreed with Paramount?
Paramount has agreed to remove restrictions on customers trying to access content from another EU country. In practice, this means it will no longer insert “geoblocking” obligations in its licensing contracts with EU broadcasters. As we previously commented, the Commission considered that the Studios bilaterally agreed restrictions with Sky UK that prevented it from both making active sales in to other EU territories and from accepting passive sales requests. These restrictions effectively granted Sky UK ‘absolute territorial exclusivity’ in the UK and Ireland, eliminating cross-border competition between Sky and other pay-TV broadcasters in other Member States.
Why is Canal Plus appealing?
Canal Plus wants the General Court to annul the Paramount settlement, as – in common with other EU broadcasters – it considers that the terms agreed with the Commission risk undermining the EU system of film financing which relies on broadcasters being able to use different pricing and release strategies for different EU counties.
The appeal seems likely to face an uphill struggle; the General Court has only recently underlined the high hurdle for a successful appeal against a commitments decision in its Morningstar judgment. Nevertheless, the Commission appears to be seeking to understand (or at least to address) this issue – it is understood to have requested further information from Sky and the remaining Hollywood Studios about the potential impact of a decision on the financing of independent films.
Sky has also been in the news of late in relation to the recent bid by Twentieth Century Fox for the 61% of Sky that it does not already own. If cleared, Sky’s future distribution arrangements with the film arm of Twentieth Century Fox are likely to fall outside of any future competition remedy imposed by the Commission in the Hollywood Studios investigation. Once their production and distribution businesses are vertically integrated, the rules on anti-competitive agreements will no longer apply, as there will no longer be any agreement between separate undertakings.
12 August 2016
Some 6 months after issuing its infringement decision against GSK and a number of generic companies, the CMA has released a non-confidential version. This comes in at a weighty 717 pages. Other than the grounds of appeal (on which we reported in the final paragraphs of this post), this is the first chance for companies and their advisors who weren’t involved in the proceedings to see the approach the CMA has taken, and to compare it with the current Commission approach. First impressions are that the CMA has closely aligned itself with the Commission’s patent settlement decisions, such as Lundbeck**. The CMA and the parties will therefore be particularly keen to see the General Court’s forthcoming judgment in that case – indeed, the case management directions set down by the Competition Appeal Tribunal in the appeal proceedings against the CMA’s decision require the parties to prepare submissions on the relevance of the GC’s judgment to the case.
For those who aren’t keen on such weighty holiday reading, but can’t stand the suspense, below are a few pointers to the parts of the CMA’s legal reasoning which may be worth dipping into:
- Paragraphs 1.3 – 1.20: A high level summary of the decision for those who only have an appetite for some light reading.
- Paragraphs 3.65 – 3.84: The CMA’s view of patents, expanded upon at paragraphs 6.19-6.22. The Windsurfing case law on the ‘public interest’ in removing ‘invalid patents’ is key: patents are treated as ‘probabilistic’ (although the term isn’t used) and are not guaranteed to be valid. Like the Commission, the CMA treats legal challenges to patent validity as part of the competitive process, and argues that the market is ‘in principle’ open to generic entry after expiry of patent protection over an API.
- Paragraphs 4.17 – 4.26: Overview of the market definition section which finds that, while other antidepressants may be substitutable for paroxetine, consumption patterns suggest that the actual competitive constraint is limited. For market definition geeks, the full analysis is at paragraphs 4.29 – 4.97. It is notable that paroxetine’s position within the ATC features only briefly, with the focus being on actual competitive constraints, including a ‘natural events’ analysis to look at the relative impact of generic entry in relation to the candidate competitor molecules (such as citalopram – the subject of the Lundbeck decision), and entry by generics of paroxetine itself (see para 4.73 in particular).
- Once the narrow market definition is established, there isn’t much suspense as to the dénouement of the dominance ‘chapter’ (paragraphs 4.98 – 4.127). In this context, the section on why the PPRS does not constrain pharmaceutical companies’ dominance is again unsurprising, but perhaps worth a read (paragraphs 4.124 – 4.126).
- Paragraphs 6.1 – 6.9 and 6.204 – 6.206 contain a summary and the conclusion of the ‘object assessment’ under Article 101/Chapter I: while generally Lundbeck-esque, the reference to “the effective transfer from GSK [to GUK/Alpharma] of profit margins” strikes me as a novel way of expressing an old idea.
- Paragraphs 7.1 – 7.3, 7.61 – 7.62 and 7.114 – 7.115 contain the summary and conclusions of the effects assessment under Article 101/Chapter I. Even though the agreements were actually operated in the market, the CMA has confined itself to looking at their ‘likely’ effects – presumably to try to account for the fact that the outcome of the discontinued litigation is unknowable. It also concludes that the agreements assisted GSK to “preserve its market power” (paragraphs 7.63 – 7.64 and 7.116 – 7.117).
- Leading on from that conclusion, paragraphs 8.1 – 8.3 summarise the case on abuse of a dominant position. Central to the abuse case is the concept of inducement by GSK. The allegations span not only the agreements in respect of which fines are issued under Article 101, but also an agreement with IVAX (for those with time on their hands, Annex M seeks to explain the discrepancy). GSK raised a number of objective justification arguments, notably around its right legitimately to defend its patent rights and to defend the company’s commercial position. Paragraphs 8.61 – 8.67 reject these arguments, in particular on the basis that the conduct was not ‘competition on the merits’ (as per AstraZeneca) and that the conduct “went beyond the legitimate exercise of its patent rights to oppose alleged infringements”.
- Finally, and again for the more technically minded, at paragraphs 10.43 – 10.53, the relevance of the Vertical Agreements Block Exemption is dismissed, on the basis that the agreements were between potential competitors rather than being true ‘vertical’ arrangements. At paragraphs 10.54 – 10.97, the parties’ Article 101(3) exemption arguments are also dismissed (spoiler alert: the exemption criteria are not found to have been fulfilled). One curiosity is the lack of an infringement decision in relation to the agreement between GSK and IVAX. This was held to benefit from the (now repealed) UK-specific Competition Act 1998 (Land and Vertical Agreements Exclusion) Order 2000 (now repealed). In other words, that agreement is treated as vertical, unlike those between GSK and each of the other generic companies, even though the decision recites that IVAX did have plans to launch its own paroxetine generic. The difference appears to be based on the context in which the agreements were reached: whereas the agreements with GUK and Alpharma related to the settlement (deferral) of litigation, that was not the case for the supply deal agreed with IVAX. This is addressed at paragraphs 10.36 – 10.47 and in Annex M.
The paragraphs listed above focus on the legal analysis. Those who prefer their reading less dry will want to look also at the descriptions of the agreements, and will note in particular that the ‘settlements’ considered in the decision did not finally resolve the litigation, but rather deferred it for the duration of the agreements entered into by GSK and the generic companies. Those who like tales of retribution will wish to read about the calculation of fines in section 11 – note that GSK received separate fines in relation to each of the agreements and the abuse of dominance.
The appeal hearing before the CAT is due to start next February, and to last for around a month. By that time, the General Court will have issued its rulings in the various appeals against the Commission’s Lundbeck decision – which will doubtless be another weighty
read for the Autumn.
** For more on Lundbeck, please see here (the abridged version) or here (the full analysis).
22 April 2016
The CMA has been slowly but surely opening a raft of new investigations in the pharma and medical devices industries.
It announced last week that it is investigating suspected anti-competitive conduct in the medical equipment sector under Chapter II CA 98 and Article 102 TFEU. An initial 6-month timetable is set down, with the CMA hoping to be in a position to decide whether to take the investigation into the Statement of Objections phase by around October. Last week also saw the CMA announce that it is investigating anti-competitive arrangements in the pharmaceutical sector under Chapter I CA and Article 102. This will follow the same timetable. Just a few weeks earlier, the CMA announced another separate investigation into suspected abuses of a dominant position in the pharma sector. The CMA recently closed a possible market investigation into possible anti-competitive causes of medicines shortages and it is possible that at least some of these investigations will be shelved before more public information is made available. However, at least two other longer-standing pharma-industry-focused investigations remain on foot, including:
- The investigation into possible excessive prices charged by Pfizer for phenytoin sodium, which we have been following here on The CLIP Board: a formal Statement of Objections has been sent in this case, and an oral hearing held; last week Pfizer was fined £10,000 for a procedural infringement in connection with a failure to provide information, a salutary reminder for those involved in CMA investigations in any industry, as the CMA itself points out (“The imposition of an administrative penalty [on Pfizer] […] is critical to achieve deterrence, ie to impress both on the party under investigation, and more widely, the seriousness of a failure to comply with a statutory deadline, without a reasonable excuse.”…). A decision is due in around August 2016.
- An investigation into possible abusive discounts which is coming towards the end of its initial phase, and should be the subject of a decision to close or proceed next month.
One case which was not shelved was the Paroxetine patent settlements case (see our earlier post here). Following the CMA’s imposition in February of £45 million of fines, it has been confirmed that GSK and all of the generics have appealed to the CAT. The full text of the infringement decision has still not been published by the CMA, but the notices of appeal against the CMA’s decision have appeared on the website of the Competition Appeal Tribunal. GSK’s appeal encompasses eight separate grounds, six of which are on issues of substantive law (with two subsidiary grounds on the fining decision). It is evident from GSK’s appeal that the CMA has followed the Commission in proceeding on the basis of both object and effect analyses in their Article 101/Chapter I infringement decisions, as well as in claiming an abuse of dominance arising from the set of facts. GSK is unsurprisingly appealing the finding of dominance, which arose from the identification of a relevant market limited to a single molecule.
The CMA is clearly keeping a close eye on the pharmaceutical and medical industries – and we will continue to keep a close eye on the CMA’s activities in this area.
20 April 2016
For those of you who read my blog post from earlier this month on the recent flurry of international IPR guidelines announcements (see here), we thought some of you might be interested in a more in depth look at the Canadian IPR Enforcement Guidelines written by Canadian law firm McCarthy Tétrault (for a link to their interesting article see here).
The article summarises the most notable new guidance in the Canadian guidelines – namely in relation to pharma patent litigation settlements, product switching, standard setting and SEPs and patent assertion entities. It also contains links to previous articles discussing the evolution of the guidelines. There are many parallels to ongoing IPR policy developments in Europe but a few differences also stand out (e.g. express discussion of the potential for criminal liability for pharma patent litigation settlements (not something that has reared its head in Europe… (yet?)) and a helpful distinction between so called ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ product switching).
1 April 2016
A number of national competition agencies have recently been reviewing their IPR guidelines giving rise to some interesting trends and developments… On 31 March 2016 the Canadian Competition Bureau released updated IPR Enforcement Guidelines (the “Canadian IPR Guidelines”) (see here for a press release and here for the Enforcement Guidelines themselves). The main revisions to the Canadian IPR Guidelines focus on the Bureau’s position on patent settlements and product switching in the pharma sector as well as the conduct of patent assertion entities and conduct involving SEP owners.
This followed hot on the heels of an announcement by the Korea Trade Commission (“KFTC”) on 30 March 2016 that the Guidelines regarding the Unfair Exercise of Intellectual Property Rights (“the Korean IPR Guidelines”), which have recently been amended, became effective on 23 March 2016 (the revised Guidelines do not yet appear to be publically available in English at least). The primary purpose of the Korean IPR Guidelines is to provide a framework for the KFTC to regulate abuse of IPRs by holders of SEPs (including in particular NPEs). The Korean IPR Guidelines were previously amended in December 2014. The most interesting changes at that time included de facto SEPs being included within the definition of SEPs, and the introduction of examples of abusive or unreasonable acts, including the filing for injunctive relief against willing licensees by an SEP holder that has committed to grant a license on fair reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms.
The most notable changes to the Korean IPR Guidelines this time around are:
- carving out de facto SEPs from the IPR Guidelines (stakeholders argued that the previous change to include them led to over-regulation of the exercise of IPRs);
- removing the reference to the choice of governing law and dispute resolution mechanism which is unilaterally unfavourable to one party as a factor in determining whether an exercise of patent rights in unfair; and
- including a standard for determining unfair refusals to license which focuses on the intent of the SEP holder, the surrounding economic circumstances and the effects of the refusal to license.
Similar developments have taken place not that far from South Korea, with China also drafting IPR Guidelines. China’s top antitrust authority, the Anti-monopoly Commission (“AMC”) of the State Council has instructed four Chinese antitrust enforcement agencies: the National Development and Reform Commission (“NDRC”); the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”); the Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”); and the State Intellectual Property Office (“SIPO”) to draft antitrust guidelines on IPRs. It has reported that these agencies are finalizing their respective drafts and that they were due to submit them to the AMC by the end of March 2016. The AMC coordinates antitrust policies in China, so it will be responsible for consolidating the drafts and issuing an integrated policy.
The purpose of the Chinese Guidelines will be to provide guidance on when the enforcement of IPRs, and in particular patents, would contravene China’s Antimonopoly law. China’s IPR Policy is still very much under development. However, these latest developments correlate with a growing international view that the Chinese antitrust authorities are increasingly treating IPR as an enforcement priority (although I think it is still agreed that China has some way to go before it becomes a major jurisdiction for the enforcement of IPR). One recent example from 2014 was the Chinese Authorities’ investigation into Qualcomm for anticompetitive conduct involving its licensing of 4G SEPs (see our previous blog post here). It is unsurprising that telecoms and pharma both come under the spotlight in all these new IPR Guidelines given the competition law issues afoot globally in both sectors. The EU Commission’s TTBE Guidelines were also updated in 2014 to include new sections relevant to pharma and telecoms (see our previous blog post here). It is also interesting to see such a detailed approach to IP and antitrust issues being taken in other jurisdictions and that these new Guidelines are in places going further than their EU counterparts, for example in their discussion of PAEs/NPEs, SEPs and injunctions and refusal to license IPRs.
12 February 2016
The CMA has fined a number of pharmaceutical companies, including GSK, for anti-competitive conduct and agreements in relation to the supply of anti-depressant drug paroxetine (albeit not as quickly as it originally intended to do, as we reported in our blog post here).
GSK had settled litigation with several generic drug companies following allegations that the generic products would infringe GSK’s patents. The settlement terms included cash payments as well as an effective transfer of profit margins by permitting the supply of limited volumes of product to the market in place of GSK. The CMA found that these terms prevented the generic companies from entering the paroxetine market and deprived the NHS of price falls averaging 70%.
This is the first UK decision to consider the application of competition law to patent settlement agreements, and only the second such decision (following Servier) to include an abuse of dominance allegation alongside the Article 101/Chapter I infringement. The timing is noteworthy – appeals in Lundbeck, the first Commission patent settlement decision, were heard a few months back, and the judgment must be due later this year. Having taken considerably longer than anticipated to reach the decision, the CMA has been left with a difficult choice of waiting for the General Court decision, knowing it would mean further delay but a possibly more robust legal basis for their own infringement finding, or pressing ahead, with the risk that any significant set-back for the Commission at European level could have an impact on how appeal-proof the CMA’s own decision is.
As yet, the text of the CMA’s decision has not been issued, but we may perhaps expect an approach which is somewhat different to the Commission’s, to hedge against these uncertainties.
The total fine by the CMA was just shy of £50 million, which included a fine of £37.6 million against GSK alone. The CMA clearly remains intent upon tackling abuses of competition law which impact the public purse. More significant for GSK and the other pharmaceutical companies involved is likely to be the potential level of follow-on damages. The Department of Health is highly likely to make a claim, and other generic companies may well also follow the pattern established with the claims that followed the OFT’s abuse finding in relation to Reckitt Benckiser’s withdrawal of Gaviscon (see here).
Sophie Lawrance and Robert Fett
9 December 2015
Last week the Commission published its 6th report on the monitoring of patent settlements, exploring the use of such agreements in the pharma sector in the EU during 2014. The report triumphantly declares that the number of agreements which limit access to the market and contain a value transfer, attracting the highest degree of antitrust scrutiny, has “stabilised at a low level”. It also claims that an increase in the total number of settlements (compared with the period before the pharmaceutical sector inquiry) demonstrates that companies have not been deterred from concluding settlements in general. Unfortunately the Commission’s conclusions are based upon a shaky foundation – the same criticisms made of the 5th report last year can be made again here. This report similarly contains a fairly limited review of the impact of the Commission’s overall policy.
First, the report fails to consider a number of other reasons that may have contributed to or caused the number of patent settlements to increase in recent years compared with the period before 2008 (e.g. number of medicines losing patent protection, general increase in litigation, greater readiness of parties to settle and the introduction of new legislation). The report doesn’t explain how, if at all, it has allowed for these variables in reaching its conclusions. The report also overlooks the reduction in the number of patent settlements concluded each year since 2012. It is therefore difficult to say with any certainty how the Commission’s enforcement activities in this area have affected the willingness of companies to engage in or to settle their patent disputes more generally.
Second, the categorisation of patent settlements is flawed: settlements which involve a genuine compromise (as opposed to one party or the other just giving up) would most likely involve some form of limitation on access to the market and potentially some form of value transfer (as defined by the Commission). It does not therefore follow that a decrease in the number of settlements of this type is necessarily a measure of effective antitrust enforcement or indeed that it enhances consumer welfare. Given the uncertainty that faces parties in the pharma sector who may be contemplating settlement it is no surprise that they may be cautious in concluding agreements of this kind.
Drawing reliable conclusions about the effect of the Commission’s enforcement activities on the settlement proclivities of the pharma sector would require something much less superficial than this annual scanning of the horizon. This applies with even greater force to any attempt to draw conclusions about the overall effect of Commission competition policy on the sector; its impact on the speed and effectiveness of generic entry; and whether the Commission’s focus on that issue has indeed incentivised pharma companies to invest more in developing innovative products or fundamental R&D – an original rationale for the sector enquiry and all that flowed from it.
1 October 2015
Last night we had the pleasure of giving a seminar at our offices on competition law developments in the pharma sector. We looked at investigations into patent settlements, and in particular the ‘pay for delay’ cases. We also reflected at how the recently published Lundbeck and Servier decisions may impact upon other important areas for pharmaceutical companies, such as licensing transactions. We concluded by drawing some ‘bright lines’ to try to assist in navigating what can sometimes appear to be a very grey area, providing practical guidance where we could. After a thorough review of a complex, and sometimes daunting, area of competition law we enjoyed a well deserved drink with many familiar faces, and some new ones too...
For those of you who couldn’t make the seminar a webinar version is available here and the slides here.