The CJEU’s Intel judgment – First thoughts and some predictions

Today’s Intel judgment from the Court of Justice does not strictly concern the Competition Law/IP interface.  However, it is a case which has considerable interest for potentially dominant companies, as well as a strong technology thread. 

At the basis of today’s judgment is the European Commission fine of €1.05bn, imposed on Intel back in 2009, and upheld by the General Court in 2014, for abusing a dominant position by granting exclusivity rebates to customers.  
In brief, the CJEU has today held that the General Court did not sufficiently analyse all of Intel’s arguments that its conduct did not foreclose competitors. The General Court’s failure to analyse the results of the ‘as efficient competitor’ (AEC) test was a particular focus of the criticism. The CJEU has therefore remitted the case to the lower court for further consideration on the central abuse of dominance question.  

Much ink will no doubt be spilled in analysing this judgment, but for now, the points below seem to be key:

  • Relevance of ‘as efficient’ competitors. The Court emphasises that Article 102 applies when conduct foreclosure of “as efficient competitors”; in other words, the provision is not intended as a tool for protecting entities which lack the ability to compete effectively and which are therefore likely to be less attractive to consumers.  
Strictly speaking, the CJEU’s remittal to the GC only requires it to look again at the AEC test because the Commission had in fact carried out such a test, and the GC had not responded to all of Intel’s arguments about it (143-144).  However, the fact that the Court embraces a reference to “competitors considered to be as efficient as [the dominant company]” within its general legal framework (133, 136) suggests that it will not be easy for competition authorities (or indeed private action claimants) to walk away from this test. This is mirrored in the Court’s description of the abuse finding which must be reached before an assessment of objective justification can take place (140).

  • Form vs. effects. On a first read, the judgment is a shot in the arm for effects- rather than form-based analysis (136-140).  On this reading, the mere fact that an exclusivity rebate exists is not enough in itself to establish anti-competitive foreclosure. The extent of dominance plays a role here, as well as the market coverage and duration of the practice (both the market coverage and duration were considered by the Advocate General to be ‘inconclusive’ in themselves).  
However, there are a couple of stings in the tail.  First, to avoid a formalist approach, a company under investigation must adduce evidence during the initial investigation to show that its conduct was not in fact capable of affecting competition (138).  Past cases (e.g. AstraZeneca) suggest that this evidence should be contemporaneous with the conduct.  Second, evidence of a strategy to exclude will be considered relevant (139).  While case law establishes that a company’s intention is less relevant than the objective effects of the conduct, it seems to us that clear evidence of an anti-competitive strategy will make it much more difficult to support an argument that the conduct was incapable of affecting competition. 

It’s perhaps too early to predict what impact this judgment will have on future cases – not least because a further referral back to the CJEU in this case remains possible.  However, a couple of possible consequences are:

  • Reduced options for formalistic short-cuts in establishing infringement – arguably this is of greater relevance in the private litigation context, given that competition authorities have tended to carry out extensive analysis of effects as a fall-back (or have closed cases where such evidence cannot be established, as with the CMA’s recent decision on impulse ice creams).
  • Again in the private litigation context, the practice of splitting questions of dominance and abuse into separate trials may not be the best solution for conduct of this kind, given that the degree of dominance may affect whether the conduct is in fact anti-competitive or not.
As for Intel’s fate when it comes back before the GC, all bets are off.  But given the CJEU’s indication of the significance of evidence of an anti-competitive strategy, we wouldn’t like to bet against a further confirmation of the Commission’s original conclusions…

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